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HYPOTHESIS OF SAVING TO JAPAN* 
By Charles Yuji HORIOKA** 
I Introduction 
The high rate of saving in Japan, especially the high rate of household saving, is a 
well-known phenomenon but one which is still not fully understood in spite of the consi-
derable research that has been conducted on the subject." In particular, little is known 
concerning the issue of whether the life-cycle hypothesis applies to Japan and whether it 
can explain the high rate of household saving in Japan. I believe that it would be 
interesting to investigate these issues more fully for the following reasons: 
First, such an investigation might shed some light on the factors underlying the high 
rate of household saving in Japan. 
Second, although extensive empirical tests of the life-cycle hypothesis have been con-
ducted using data from the United States and other countries, the evidence is frequently 
contradictory, and as a result, economists are deeply divided concerning the validity and 
explanatory power of the life-cycle hypothesis." Therefore, additional evidence of any 
kind would help to settle the controversy. 
Third, it would be interesting to ascertain whether the life-cycle hypothesis is applica-
ble in a non-Western society with a different culture, set of values, etc. A key difference 
is the greater strength of the family unit in Japan, as a result of which intergenerational 
transfers and extended-family living arrangements are far more common. Such values and 
practices have allegedly weakened in recent years in Japan, but the evidence to be 
presented later will suggest that they are still very much alive and hence capable of 
influencing household saving behavior in a number of important ways. 
Fourth, in addition to the cultural differences mentioned above, Japan also exhibits a 
number of institutional differences which have a bearing on household saving behavior. 
For example, Japan is the only country I know of in which a sizable fraction of the 
workforce receives a lump-sum severance payment upon retirement that is typically 
equal to two-and-a-half to four times their regular annual salary. Moreover, some 
corporations pay pensions in lieu of, or in addition to, these retirement payments, and 
* I am indebted to Hwang, Hueg Jane, and Yap, Nget Wah, for able research assistance. 
** Lecturer, Faculty of Economics, Kyoto University. 
I) See, far example, Blumenthal (1970), Kanamari (1961), Kamiya (966), Mizaguchi (1970), 
Mizaguchi (1973), and Shinahara (1982). 
2) The literature is too vast to survey comprehensively, but some key references are Danziger et al. 
(1982/83), Menchik and David (1983), Mirer (1979), King and Dicks-Mireaux (1982), and 
Katlikaff and Summers (1981). 
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public old-age pensions, which were formerly relatively meager, have been greatly improved, 
especially since 1973, and now exceed the level of benefits prevailing in the United States. 
I believe that an analysis of the impact of these factors on household saving behavior 
would be interesting and that the life-cycle hypothesis, as extended by Feldstein (1974), 
is the most appropriate framework for such an analysi,. 
The organization of this paper is as follows: I first present a brief exposition of the 
life-cycle hypothesis of saving in Section II. In Section III, I show that the life-cycle 
hypothesis predicts a high household saving rate for the case of Japan and hence that it 
would be capable of explaining Japan's high household saving rate if it were valid. In 
Section IV, I present evidence concerning the validity of the implications and basic pre-
mise of the life-cycle hypothesis in Japan using a variety of data sources (both household 
budget surveys and attitudinal surveys) and conclude that the life-cycle hypothesis is 
apparently of only limited validity in Japan. Finally, in Section V, I formulate a modified 
version of the life-cycle hypothesis that incorporates intergenerational transfers and suggest 
that it may be of greater validity than the conventional life-cycle hypothesis in the case 
of Japan. 
II The Life-Cycle Hypothesis 
The life-cycle hypothesis states that, 
on the average, earning power tends to dry up well before the termination of life 
and that the preferred allocation of resources over life will typically call for a 
rate of consumption, after this drying up, on a scale commonsurate with earlier 
consumption. Under these conditions, households must, on average, save in the 
earlier part of their life in order to accumulate a stock of wealth (possibly in some 
form of retirement insurance) which will eventually be used to support consump-
tion through dissaving in the later part of their life (Modigliani (1966), p. 163). 
In short, the bypothesis states that individuals save during their ';"orking years to finance 
their consumption during retirement. 
Given a number of assumptions (e. g., that there are no bequests, that the interest 
rate is zero, that it is optimal for the consumer to consume his income at an even rate 
throughout the balance of his life, and that income is constant), the life-cycle hypothesis 
implies that the individual saving rate of pre-retirement individuals will be: 
( I) 
where s=the saving rate 
S=saving 
Y=income 
M=the retirement span 
L=the life span of economic significance (i. e., L=ll1+N, where N=the earning 
span) 
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(Modigliani and Brumberg (1980), pp. 130-136). The intuitive rationale for this expression 
is as follows: since by assumption the individual desires to maintain a constant level of 
consumption throughout his lifetime, he must accumulate enough during his working years 
to maintain the same level of consumption during his retirement years. This requires 
accumulating eM within N years, where C=annual consumption. In other words, it is 
necessary that S=CM/N. Substituting N=L-M and C=Y-S into this expression yields: 
( 2) S _(Y-SJM 
- L M . 
Solving equation (2) for SlY yields equation (I). 
Turning to the aggregate household saving rate, the life-cycle hypothesis implies that, 
gIven certain assumptions, 
in a stationary economy of constant population and productivity ... the aggregate 
rate of saving would be zero as the positive saving of the younger households, in 
their accumulation phase, would be precisely offset by the dissaving of the retired 
households drawing down their earlier accumulation (Modigliani (1966), p. 163). 
However, if we drop the assum ption of stationarity and 
let income grow as a result of population growth or of growth in income per 
employed resulting from increasing productivity, [w] e can then show that saving 
will become positive, even in the absence of bequests (Modigliani (1966), p. 166). 
For example, if population grows at the rate p, 
[t]he effect of this growth will be to increase the ratio of younger households in 
their accumulation phase to older households in their dissaving phase, giving rise 
to a positive net flow of saving (Modigliani (1966), p. 166). 
Moreover, 
the proportionality factor s, or saving-income ratio, may be expected to increase 
with p, as the relative frequency of households in their accumulation phase will 
tend to increase monotonically with p, ... (Modigliani (1966), p. 166). 
With respect to productivity growth, if 
population is stationary but average income earned at each age, and hence also 
aggregate income, rises gradually in time, as a result of increasing productivity, 
[tJhis cause of growth will also tend to result in a positive rate of saving .... 
This is because each successive cohort will enjoy life earnings larger than the 
preceding ones, and therefore a larger level of consumption at each age, since 
by assumption the distribution of consumption over life remains constant in time. 
It follows in particular that the currently active households will be aiming at a 
level of consumption in their retirement period larger than the consumption en-
joyed by the currently retired households belonging to a less affluent generation. 
To support this future level of retired consumption the active households will have 
to save currently on a scale exceeding the dissaving of retired households. Thus, 
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even if population were stationary, net aggregate saving will tend to be positive 
(Modigliani (1966), p. 167). 
(Explicit formulae for the aggregate household saving rate which take account of popula-
tion growth and productivity growth are derived in Modigliani and Brumberg (1980), pp. 
140-143.) 
Thus, as Modigliani observes, 
our model of individual behavior is seen to imply that in the long run the propor-
tion of aggregate income saved depends not on the level of income as such but, 
rather, on the rate of growth of income; furthermore, for a given growth this 
proportion is very nearly the same whether the growth results from an expanding 
population, increasing productivity, or both (Modigliani and Brumberg (1980), p. 
143) . 
To summarize, we have seen that, given our assumptions, the individual saving rate of 
pre-retirement individuals will equal M/L (the ratio of the individual's retirement span to 
his lifespan), meaning that it will be higher, the longer is the retirement span of individuals 
relative to their lifespans. This result implies, of course, that M/L will also exert a positive 
impact on the aggregate household saving rate as long as the aggregate saving rate is 
positive to begin with. In addition, we saw that, although the aggregate saving rate of 
the household sector as a whole will be zero in a stationary economy of constant population 
and productivity, it will be positive if population and/or productivity are increasing. Mo-
reover, the aggregate household saving rate will generally be higher, the higher is the rate 
of increase of population and productivity growth. 
III Life-Cycle Saving in Japan 
In this section, I will temporarily assume that the life-cycle hypothesis is valid in Japan 
and use the foregoing theoretical results to determine the level of the aggregate household 
saving rate implied by the life-cycle hypothesis. 
In the previous section, we found that the aggregate household saving· rate will be 
higher, the higher is: 
( 1) the ratio of the retirement span to the lifespan, 
( 2) the rate of population growth, and 
( 3) the rate of prod uctivity growth. 
I will now present data from a [lUmber of sources which allow an international comparISon 
of the levels of these variables. 
( 1) The Ratio of the Retirement Span to the Lifespan. Since it is the expected 
retirement span that will itlfluence individual saving behavior, we desire informatiotl Otl 
expected retirement age and life expectancy. The customary retirement age at most 
Japanese companies was formerly fifty-five, but an increasing number of companies have 
adopted a later retirement age (with sixty being the most common) in recent years; as a 
result, the average retirement age at private corporations is now fifty-seven to fifty-eight. 
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International data on retirement ages are difficult to obtain, but it appears likely that 
even a retirement age of sixty is early by international standards. (For example, the retire-
ment age in the United States has traditionally been sixty-five, but the law now states that 
employers cannot force workers to retire before age seventy.) It must be noted, however, 
that the Japanese retirement age figures just cited refer not to complete withdrawal from 
the labor force but merely to retirement from "permanent employee" status. It is relatively 
common for Japanese workers to continue working for many years after formal retirement, 
either in the same company, a subsidiary of the company, a different company, or on a 
self-employed basis. In fact, despite the relatively early "retirement" age, the labor force 
participation rate of the aged in Japan is one of the highest among the developed coun-
tries. As shown in Table I, the labor force participation rate of males aged 65 and over 
is 40 to 46 percent (depending on the data source), whereas the corresponding figure is 
17 percent for the United States and 3 to 32 percent for the other Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) member countries (with the exception 
of Turkey, which has a labor force participation rate of aged males of 44 percent)." If 
the Japanese figures are broken down further, one finds that the labor force participation 
rate is 57 to 65 percent for males aged 65 to 69, 38 to 45 percent for those aged 70 to 
74, and 19 to 23 percent for those aged 75 and over (again, depending on the data 
source). Thus, the labor force participation rate of aged males remains above fifty percent 
until about age 70, which is a full ten to fifteen years after formal retirement. Moreover, 
the labor force participation rate of males remains quite high even after age 70 (even 
after age 75 for that matter) and is much higher than the corresponding figure for most 
other OECD countries in every age group above 65. Thus, it can be seen that although 
formal retirement occurs earlier in Japan, complete withdrawal from the labor force occurs 
much later than in most other OECD countries, and this will tend to shorten the 
retirement span of Japanese workers. (It should be noted, however, that the labor force 
participation rate of aged males is generally at or above the Japanese level in many 
developing countries. Moreover, it should also be noted that, while complete withdrawal 
from the labor force occurs relatively late in Japan, there IS typically a substantial 
reduction in income after formal retirement.) 
Turning now to an international comparison of male life expectancy, Table 2 presents 
figures on the life expectancy of males at birth and at age 65 for the OECD countries. 
As this table shows, Japan's life expectancy at birth is highest of all OECD countries 
(having recently surpassed that of Iceland) and her life expectancy at age 65 is second 
only to Iceland. Male life expectancy at birth is 73. 79 years in Japan as compared to 
3) I present data on the labor force participation rate of the aged and on life expectancy for males 
only because, despite recent increases in the labor force participation rate of females, it is still 
generally the male who is the primary wage earner of the household with responsibility for the 
financial support of his wife and other dependents. Moreover, international data on the labor 
force participation rate of female aged would be difficult to interpret because they would reflect 
not only differences among countries in retirement patterns but also differences among countries 
in the labor force participation rate of females. 
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Table 1: An International Comparison ci Labor Force Participation Rates of the Aged 
Country Year, Data Source 
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International Labour Office, 1983 Year Book of Labour Statistics (43rd issue) (Geneva: International 
Labour Office, 1983), Table 1, pages 13-37. The figures show the percent of each age group of 
males that is economically active. 
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60.30 to 73. 70 years for the other OEeD countries, while that at age 65 is 14.85 years 
as compared to 11.83 to 14.33 years for the other OEeD countries (with the exception 
of Iceland, for which the corresponding figure is 15. 80). Moreover, although figures for 
non-OEeD countries are not shown in Table 2, it is a fact that Japan's life expectancy is 
(with the possible exception of Iceland) the highest in the world, and this will obviously 
tend to increase the retirement span of Japanese workers. (I have presented figures on life 
Table 2: An International Comparison of Male Life Expectancy 
Year 
Life Expectancy of Males 
Country 
At birth At age 65 
Australia 1981 71. 38 13.87 
Austria 1975-80 68.97 12.97 
Belgium 1972-76 68.60 12.28 
Canada 1975-77 70. 19 13.95 
Denmark 1980-81 71. 10 13.60 
Finland 1981 69.53 12.83 
France 1978-80 70.05 13.81 
Germany, West 1979-81 69.93 13.02 
Greece 1970 70.13 13.87 
Iceland 1979-80 73. 70 15.80 
Ireland 1970-72 68.77 12.41 
Italy 1974-77 69.69 na 
japan 1981 73. 79 14.85 
Luxembourg 1979 66.80 na 
Netherlands 1980 72.40 14.00 
New Zealand 1975-77 69.01 na 
Norway 1980-81 72.49 14.28 
Portugal 1975 65.09 12.32 
Spain 1975 70.41 13.58 
Sweden 1981 73. 05 14.33 
Switzerland 1977-78 72.00 14.20 
Turkey 1975-80 60.30 na 
United Kingdom 
England/Wales 1978-80 70.40 12.80 
Northern Ire. 1976-78 67. 76 II. 83 
Scotland 1979-81 68.61 I I. 99 
United States 1979 70.00 14.30 
Yugoslavia 1970-72 65.42 12.42 
Note: 
na denotes not available. 
Data Source: 
United Nations, Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, 
Statistical Office, ed., Demographic Yearbook, 1982 edition (34th issue) (New 
York: United Nations, 1984), Table 21, pp. 438-465. 
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expectancy at age 65 because these figures are better indicators of the expected retirement 
spans of workers approaching retirement than the figures on life expectancy at birth 
assuming that 65 is a good estimate of the average retirement age of all countries.) 
To summarize, the virtually unsurpassed life expectancy of the Japanese has unambi-
guously led to a longer retirement span and this, in turn, should have contributed toward 
raising the aggregate household saving rate. However, the impact of the retirement age 
is less clear: the earlier formal retirement age will tend to lengthen the retirement span, 
but the much later age of complete withdrawal from the labor force will tend to shorten 
it. In order for us to determine the impact of retirement patterns on the length of the 
retirement span and thence on the aggregate household saving rate, more information is 
needed on the number of hours worked and on the degree to which income is reduced 
during the period of semi-retirement that extends from formal retirement to complete 
withdrawal from the labor force. 
( 2) The Rates of Population Growth and Productivity Growth. Table 3 presents 
comparative data on the average annual rate of growth of real Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) , real per capita GDP, and population during the 1960-70 and 1970-80 periods for 
all the OEeD countries. Note that the rate of real per capita GDP growth is a measure 
of productivity growth and that, by definition, the growth rate of real GDP equals the 
sum of the growth rate of per capita GD P and the growth rate of population. 
Looking first at population growth, the table shows that the average annual rate of 
population growth in Japan was I. I percent during the 1960s and 1.2 percent during the 
1970s, which is close to the average for the OEeD countries (the range was O. 0 to 2. 2 
percent during the 1960s and 0.0 to 1.6 percent during the 1970s if Turkey, which 
showed an unusually high 2.6 percent population growth rate during both periods, is 
excl uded) ." 
With respect to productivity growth (or the growth of real per capita GDP), by 
contrast, Japan showed by far the highest growth rate of all OEeD countries during the 
1960s (9.3 percent). The next highest was Greece with 6.8 percent, while the United 
States registered a 3. 1 percent growth rate and the range for the other OEeD countries 
was from 2.3 to 5.9 percent. During the 1970s, Japan experienced a sharp decline in 
productivity growth from the earlier 9.3 percent to 3. 4 percent because of the oil crises and 
the advent of the era of stable growth. Even so, however, because virtually every other 
country also recorded a decline in its rate of productivity growth, Japan's rate of growth 
remained higher than most other OEeD countries (with only four showing a higher rate 
of productivity growth than Japan). 
To summarize, while Japan's rate of population growth was about average for the 
OEeD countries, her rate of productivity growth was by far the highest of the OEeD 
countries during the 1960s and, despite registering a substantial decline during the 1970s, 
4) As Modigliani notes, the growth rate of the labor force or of the working age popUlation is a 
more appropriate measure for our purposes than the growth rate of the total popUlation, but the 
various measures "ought to be dose to each other ... if population were in 'balanced growth' 
(Modigliani (1970), p. 210)." 
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Table 3: An International Comparison of the Growth Rates of Real GDP, 
Per Capita Real GD P, and Population 
Average Annual Rates of Growth 
Country 1960-70 I 1970-80 
I Real GDP Real GDP I Per Capita Population I Per Capita I Population Real GDP Real GDP 
Australia 5.9* i 3. 7* 2.2' I 2.8 1.4 
I 
1.4 
Austria 4.6 4.0 0.6 3.5 3.4 O. I 
Belgium 4. 7 4. I 0.6 3. I 2.9 0.2 
Canada 5.6 3. 7 1.9 4.0 2.8 1.2 
Denmark 4. 7 3.9 0.8 2.3 1.9 0.4 
Finland 4.3 3.8 0.5 3.0 2. 7 0.3 
France 5.5 4.4 1. I 3.6 3.0 0.6 
Germany, West 4.4 3.5 0.9 2. 7 2.6 O. I 
Greece 7.5 6.8 O. 7 4.6 3.6 1.0 
Iceland 4.5 2.9 1.6 4.5 3.2 1.3 
Ireland 4.2 3.8 0.4 4.2 2.6 1.6 
Italy 5. 7 5.0 O. 7 3.0 2.3 O. 7 
Japan 10.4 9.3 l.l 4.6 3.4 1.2 
Luxembourg 3.4 2.6 0.8 2.6 2.0 O. 6 
Netherlands 5.3 4.0 1.3 2.9 2. I 0.8 
New Zealand na na na na 
Norway 4.9 4.0 0.9 4.8 4.2 0.6 
Portugal 5.9 5.9 0.0 4.3 3.0 1.3 
Spain 7. I 5.9 1.2 3. 7 2. 7 1.0 
Sweden 4.4 3.6 0.8 2.0 1.6 0.4 
Switzerland 4.3 2.8 1.5 0.5 0.3 0.2 
Turkey 6.0 3.4 2.6 6. I 3.5 2.6 
United Kingdom 2.9 2.3 0.6 1.9 1.9 0.0 
United States 4.4 3. I 1.3 3.0 2.0 1.0 
Yugoslavia*** 6.3 5.2 1.1 5.9'* 4.9** I. 0** 
World 5. 7 3.5 2.2 3.9 2.1 1.8 
Europe 4. 7 3.9 0.8 2.9 2.3 0.6 
Notes; 
* These figures are for 1963-70. 
** These figures are for 1970-79. 
*.* The figures for Yugoslavia refer to Net Material Product (NMP) rather than to GDP. 
na denotes not available. 
Data Source: 
United Nations, Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics, volume 2, International Tables. (New 
York: United Nations, annual). Used primarily the 1980 and 1981 editions. 
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remained higher than most other OECD countries. Thus, the two factors together should 
have contributed toward raising Japan's aggregate household saving rate above the OECD 
average during the postwar period. Moreover, as seen earlier, the longer life expectancy 
and the earlier formal retirement age in Japan should also have contributed toward raising 
the aggregate household saving rate (assuming that the period from formal retirement to 
complete withdrawal from the labor force is not characterized by earniugs of close to the 
magnitude prevailing prior to formal retirement). 
Thus, on balance, the life-cycle hypothesis predicts that Japan should have displayed 
an aggregate household saving rate that is well above the average for the OECD countries, 
and this prediction is consistent with the high household saving rate actually observed in 
Japan during the postwar period. However, there are numerous other possible explanations 
of Japan's high household saving rate, and the foregoing analysis does not establish the 
dominance of the life-cycle hypothesis over these competing hypotheses. Moreover, a 
rigorous analysis of the various competing hypotheses is beyond the scope of this paper. 
My objective for the remainder of this paper is a far more modest one: having 
established that, if the life-cycle hypothesis were valid in Japan, it would be capable of 
explaining Japan's high household saving rate, I now wish to present evidence concerning 
the applicability of the life-cycle hypothesis to Japan. If the evidence suggests that the 
hypothesis is not valid, we can conclude that the life-cycle hypothesis apparently does not 
provide an explanation of Japan's high household saving rate in spite of the conclusion of 
the foregoing analysis. If, on the other hand, the evidence suggests that the hypothesis is 
valid, we can conclude that the life-cycle hypothesis apparently does provide a partial 
explanation of Japan's high household saving rate although we will still not know what its 
explanatory power is relative to competing hypotheses. 
IV The Empirical Evidence 
There are at least two possible tests of the life-cycle hypothesis. The first is to test 
the validity of the imPlications of the life-cycle hypothesis-namely, that individuals show a 
"humped" pattern of wealth accumulation, accumulating saving during their working years 
and decumulating it (dissaving) during their retirement years. The second is to the test 
the validity of the basic premise of the hypothesis-namely, that saving for life during 
retirement is a major motive for saving during the individual's working years and that his 
accumulated savings are a primary source of income during his retirement years. We 
now turn to these tests in this order. 
A. Tests of the Implications of the Life-Cycle Hypothesis. 
The first test consists of ascertaining whether household wealth holdings display the humped 
pattern predicted by the life-cycle hypothesis, rising until retirement, then falling, or 
equivalently, whether saving flows are positive until retirement and negative thereafter. 
The various household budget surveys conducted by the government are seemingly 
well-suited to an analysis of this issue. For example, Table 4, which is based on data from 
the 1982 Family Saving Survey (Chochiku D6k6 Ch6sa) of the Prime Minister's Office, 
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Tab e 4: Household Wealth Holdings by the Age Group of the Household Head 
Age group Income I Financial Assets Liabilities II Financial Net Worth 
, 
Worker Households 
All ages 5,024 5,911 0.18) 1,743 (0.35) 4, 169 (0.83) 
- 24 3,170 
I 
1,983 (0.63) 121 (0.04) 1,862 (0.59) 
25 - 29 3,592 2,508 (0.70) 848 (0.24) 1,659 (0.46) 
30 - 34 3,947 3,451 (0.87) 1,458 (0.37) 1,993 (0.50) 
35 - 39 4,592 I 4,651 (1.01) 2,072 (0.45) 2,579 (0.56) 
40 - 44 5,140 
I 
5,368 (I. 04) 2, 367 (0.46) 3,001 (0.58) 
45 - 49 5,501 6,287 (I. 14) 2,050 (0.37) 4,237 (0.77) 
50 - 54 6,288 7,123 (I. 13) 1,724 (0.27) 5,398 (0.86) 
55 - 59 6, 315 
[ 
11,683 (1.85) 1,236 (0.20) 10,447 (I. 65) 
60 - 64 5,129 11,210 (2.19) 834 (0.16) 10,376 (2.02) 
65 - I 4,444 I 9,719 
(2. 19) 325 (0.07) 9, 394 (2. 11) 
, I 
All H ous,holds 
I 
I 
I All ages 5,051 6,972 (1.38) 
I 
1,858 (0.37) 5,113 (I. 01) 
- 24 3,129 i 1,769 
(0.57) 237 (0.08) 1,532 (0.49) 
25 - 29 3,659 
I 
2, 512 (0.69) 1,006 (0.27) 1,506 (0.41) 
30 - 34 4,018 3,650 (0.91) 1,564 (0.39) 2,085 (0.52) 
35 - 39 4,607 I 4, 657 (I. 01) 2,220 (0.48) 2,437 (0.53) 
40 - 44 5,174 ! 5,849 (l.l3) 2,504 ro. 48) 3, 346 (0.65) 
45 - 49 5,414 I 6, 797 (I. 26) 2, 621 (0.31) 4,176 (0.77J 
I 
50 - 54 6,276 I 8,088 (I. 29) I 1,970 (0.48) 6,117 (0.98) 55 - 59 6,000 I 11,540 (I. 92) 1,412 (0.24) 10, 128 (I. 69) 
I 
I I 60 - 64 5,049 
I 
11,551 (2.29) 1,059 (0.21) 10,492 (2.08) i 
65 - 4,637 10,488 (2.26) I 791 (0. 17) 9,697 (2.09) I 
Notes: 
The income figures refer to annual pre-tax income; the age figures refer to the age of the 
household head; the financial figures are in thousands _of yen; the figures in parentheses 
represent ratios to pre-tax annual income. 
Data Source: 
Prime Minister's Office, Statistics Bureau (S6rifu T6kei-kyoku), Chochiku D8ko Chosa Hokoku 
(Family Saving Survey), 1982 edition (Tokyo: Zaidan-hojin Nippon Tokei-kyokai, 1983), Table 7. 
Statistics Bureau (S6rifu T6kei-kyoku), shows wealth holdings by the age group of the 
household head for worker households and all households. As the table shows, the absolute 
amounts of both financial asset holdings and financial net worth increase monotonically 
through the 55-59 or 60-64 age group, then taper off slightly in the highest age group(s). 
By contrast, the ratio of wealth holdings to income increases continuously with age, with 
no tendency to taper off, even in the highest age group (except for the financial asset 
holdings of all households). Since the discrepancy arises due to the decliuc in income in 
the higher age groups, it appears preferable to focus on the figures showi,,[\" the absolute 
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amounts of wealth holdings. However, even these figures show only a moderate 
decumulation of wealth holdings in the highest age group(s), whereas the life-cycle 
hypothesis would have led us to expect a much sharper rate of decumulation (unless 
uncertainty about the date of death moderates the rate of decumulation). Thus, the data 
provide only limited support for the life-cycle hypothesis. 
Turning now from stock data on wealth holdings to flow data on saving, Table 5 
presents data on saving by the age group of the household head that are taken from the 
same source as Table 4. The life-cycle hypothesis predicts a negative saving rate during 
Table 5: Household Saving by the Age Group of the Household Head 
Age group 
I
· I Change in I Ch . .. ange In Income Fmanclal L' bTt' Assets la Illes I 
~~ang~ in I Change in I Change in Nl;tw~arth Fixed Assets Net Worth 
, 
Worker Households 
All ages 5,024 649 (0. 13) 87 (0.02) I 561 (0. II) 376 (0.07) 938 (0.19) 
- 24 3,170 475 (0.15) -8( -0.00) 482 (0. 15) 0 (0.00) 482 (0. 15) 
25 - 29 3,592 567 (0.16) 114 (0.03) 452 (0.13)[ 137 (0.04) I 589 (0. 16) 
30 - 34 i 3,947 411 (0.10) 118 (0.03) 293 (0.07) 361 (0.09) 654 (0. 17) 
35 - 39 4,592 589 (0. 13) -H( -0. 00) 603 (0.13)1 280 (0.06)1 884 (0.19) 
40 - 44 5, 140 639 (0. 12) 268 (0.05) 371 (0. 07) 541 (0.11) 912 (0.18) 
45 - 49 5,501 609 (0.11) 105 (0.02) 504 (0.09)1 492 (0.09) 997 CO. 18) 
50 - 54 6,288 772 (0. 12) 9 (0.00) 763 (0. 12) 258 (0.04) 1,022 (0. 16) 
55 - 59 6,315 1,140 (0. 18) -371-0.01) 1,177 (0.19) 390 (0.06) 1,568 (0.25) 
60 - 64 5,129 734 (0. 14) 64 (0.01) 670 (0.13) 631 (0. 12) 1,301 (0.25) 




I All H ous,holds I 
All ages 5,051 608 (0. 12) 142 (0.03) 467 (0.09) 394 (0.08) 860 (0. 17) 
- 24 3, 129 480 (0.15) 96 (0.03) 384 (0.12) 0 (0.00) 384 (0. 12) 
25 - 29 3,659 566 (0.15) 90 (0. 02) 476 (0.13) 126 (0.03) 602 (0. 16) 
30 - 34 4,018 432 (0.11) 168 (0.04) 264 (0.07) 370 (0.09) 634 (0.16) 
35 - 39 4,607 564 (0.12) 55 (0.01) 509 (0. 11) 330 (0.07) 840 (0. 18) 
40 - 44 5,174 703 (0.14) 314 (0.06) 389 (0.08) 509 (0. !O) 898 (0. 17) 
45 - 49 5,414 575 (0. 11) 229 (0.04) 346 (0.06) 559 (0. !O) 904 (0. 17) 
50 - 54 6,276 701 (0.11) 115 (0.02) 586 (0.09) 398 (0.06) 983 (0.16) 
55 - 59 6,000 1,005 (0. 17) -72(-0.01) 1,077 (0.21) 331 (0.06) 1,409 (0.23) 
60 - 64 5, 049 494 (0. !O) -4( -0.00) 498 (0.10) 278 (0.06) 777 (0.15) 
65 - 4,639 420 (0.09) 180 (0.04) 240 (0.05) 354 (0.08) 594 (0. 13) 
Notes: 
The income figures refer to annual pre-tax income; the age figures refer to the age of the 
household head; the financial figures are in thousands of yen; the figures in parentheses 
represent ratios to annual pre-tax income. 
Data Source: 
Prime Minister's Office, Statistics Bureau (S6rifu Tokei-kyoku), Chochiku Diiko Chosa Hokoku 
(Family Saving Survey), 1982 edition (Tokyo: Zaidan h6jin Nippon Tokei-kyokai, 1983), Table 
27. 
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old age as households decumulate the wealth they have accumulated during their working 
years, but this table shows that saving remains positive, even in the highest age group, 
whether it is measured by the change in financial assets, the change in financial net worth, 
or the change in (total) net worth." There is a tendency for the absolute amount of 
saving to decline after peaking in the 55-59 age group, regardless of the measure of saving 
used, but this tendency is not as clear when one focuses on the saving-to-income ratios 
because the decline in the absolute amount of saving in the upper age groups is accom· 
panied by a decline in income." Moreover, as just noted, even if one focuses on the 
figures for the absolute amounts of saving, the decline is not sharp enough to cause saving 
to become negative, as predicted by the life-cycle hypothesis. On the surface, therefore, 
the foregoing evidence suggests that the life-cycle hypothesis has little applicability to the 
case of Japan. 
However, I believe that such a conclusion is premature due to the problems inherent 
in the data presented above. First, and perhaps most serious, the data are broken down 
by the age of the household head, where the household head is defined as the household 
member with the highest income, not as the household head shown on the family register. 
Since the elderly in Japan often live with their grown children, as we will show later, and 
since the elderly are likely to be retired or earning substantially less than they did during 
their prime working years, i[ is unlikely for an elderly individual to be classified as a 
household head if the above definition is used. A small proportion of the elderly will 
qualify as household heads (for example, these living apart from their grown children and 
those who are living with their grown children but continuing to earn an income that 
exceeds that of their grown children), and for these elderly, the Family Saving Survey 
and other similar surveys do collect information. However, these elderly are unlikely to be 
representative of all elderly individuals, and thus we have no direct or indirect information 
concerning the vast majority of elderly individuals who have been absorbed into other 
households." It is quite possible that although the life-cycle hypothesis does not apply 
to the elderly who are household heads (many of whom are likely to be still employed), 
5) It is not immediately clear why the stock and flow data are mutually inconsistent. 
6) Kanamori (1961) analyzed similar data from the 1959 Family Saving Survey and found that aged 
households show a higher saving rate than younger households, even after controlling for income 
differences. This finding is even more contrary to the life-cycle hypothesis than my own finding. 
A more recent analysis is Mikami (1984). 
Komiya suggests that the saving rate of the elderly is high because (1) consumption needs 
decline with age and (2) the incomes of the elderly are high due to the Annual Proportional-
Wage-Increase System (Komiya (]966), pp. 172-173). However, the latter f.ctor applies only 
until the age of formal retirement (generally 55 to 60) and hence cannot explain why saving 
remains relatively high even after age 60 although it does explain why saving is highest for the 
55-59 age group. Komiya also notes that "in Japan, those who are oJder than 65 or 70 (whose 
European and American counterparts usually live on negative savings) are typically absorbed 
into their children's households, thus presumably contributing to society's saving by lessening 
social overhead expenditures which the maintenance of independent households would necessitate 
(Komiya (1966), pp. 173-174)." We will discuss this point further below. 
7) I am indebted to Professor Albert Ando for discussions concerning this point. 
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it does apply to the dependent elderly (who are more likely to be retired or at least 
semi-retired) • 
A related problem is that the data pertain to households rather than to individuals. 
As a result, even the data for households headed by elderly individuals may not be 
accurate because they include the income, saving, etc., of all other household members. 
Thus, it is conceivable that the elderly household head is dissaving but that this dissaving 
is being offset by the saving being done by other household members. 
Third, there is the problem of incomplete coverage of asset types. The Family Saving 
Survey collects stock data on financial assets and liabilities only, and flow data on financial 
assets, liabilities, and fixed assets only. No data are available on the other components of 
net worth, such as human wealth (the present value of future earnings) and private and 
public pension wealth (the present value of pension rights). It could be that although 
the components of wealth for which data are available show no marked tendency to 
decline during old age the components of wealth for which no information is available do 
show a significant tendency to decline with age. 
Fourth, the data presented above are classified only by age and not by retirement 
status. As noted earlier, even individuals of very advanced age would not be expected to 
dissave if they were still working and earning a level of income that is comparable to what 
they were earning during their prime working years. It is quite possible that, if the data 
were broken down by not only age but also retirement status, the hypothesized pattern of 
wealth decumulation would be observed for the retired elderly, though not for the working 
elderly. In fact, indirect evidence on this point can be gleaned from Tables 4 and 5. 
Both tables present data separately for worker households and all households. Worker 
households are those households in which the head is a currently employed salaried 
worker, whereas the "all households" category includes not only worker households but 
also households in which the head is self-employed, unemployed, or retired. Thus, the 
"all households" category includes households in which the head is retired whereas 
the "worker households" category does not and we would therefore expect the wealth 
decumulation predicted by the life-cycle hypothesis to be more conspicuous in the data 
pertaining to "all households." This result is not confirmed in Table 4, which presents 
stock data, but is confirmed in Table 5, which presents flow data: the fall off in saving 
(however measured) in the two highest age groups IS far more pronounced for "all 
households" than it is for "worker households."81 
To summarize, although the household budget survey data presented above provide 
little evidence of the humped saving pattern implied by the life-cycle hypothesis, this 
could be the result of the deficiencies of the data rather than of the inapplicability of the 
life-cycle hypothesis to Japan. A more conclusive test of the validity of the implications 
of the life-cycle hypothesis must await the availability of data which remedy the deficiencies 
inherent in the Family Saving Survey and the other household budget surveys currently 
8) A fifth problem with the above data is that they are cross-section data. A proper test of the 
life-cycle hypothesis requires data on a single age cohort over time. 
THE APPLICABILITY OF THE LIFE-CYCLE HYPOTHESIS OF SAVING TO JAPAN 45 
being conducted. 
B. Tests of the Premise of the Life-Cycle Hypothesis. 
In the previous section, we were unfortunately unable to conduct a conclusive test of 
the validity of the implications of the life-cycle hypothesis because of the inadequacy of 
the data from household budget surveys. In this section, we will test the validity of the 
basic premise of the life-cycle hypothesis using data from a variety of attitudinal surveys. 
Due to the richness of these surveys and the possibility of international comparisons, we 
are optimistic that the second test will yield more conclusive results than the first. 
Before analyzing the data themselves, however, we will first attempt to arrive at an a 
priori expectation concerning the validity of the premise of the life-cycle hypothesis in 
Japan. A review of the various cultural, institutional, and other factors that would be 
expected to influence the degree of validity of the life-cycle hypothesis suggests that it 
might be especiaIly unlikely to apply in the case of Japan. There are basicaIly four 
reasons for this conclusion: 
( I) Greater Family Support. The elderly in Japan often receive substantial financial 
and in-kind support from their children and often live with their eldest son or other 
child, thereby saving on living expenses. Such traditional customs mal' be weakening with 
the passage of time, but to the extent that they still hold, "family security" wiIl compensate 
for any deficiencies in "social security," and therefore the need to provide for one's own 
retirement will not necessarily be any greater in Japan." 
( 2) The Higher Labor Force Participation Rate of the Elderly. As already 
documented, individuals in Japan often work until a very advanced age (although the 
hours may be fewer and the wages lower after formal retirement), and this shortens or 
eliminates the retirement period during which the individual has no earnings of his own. 
( 3) The High Level of Retirement Payments and Company Pensions. Japanese 
workers in larger corporations and government workers often receive substantial lump-sum 
retirement payments and/or company pensions. The former typicaIly amount to two-and-
a-half to four times the worker's annual salary immediately prior to retirement. 
( 4) The High Level of Public Pensions. Although public pension benefits were 
relatively low in Japan by international standards until the early 1970s, benefit levels have 
since been significantly upgraded and are now comparable to the levels prevailing in other 
industrialized countries. 
To summarize, workers in Japan may not feel much need to save for life during old 
age since they expect to receive employment income, support from their children, retirement 
payments and/or company pensions, and public pensions during their old age, all of which 
can be used to finance their consumption needs. 
I now present the evidence that will indicate whether or not my a priori expectation 
9) As Komiya has noted, .. 'To provide for security after retirement' seems a rather weak motive 
for saving in Japan, from a sociological viewpoint. Unlike the United States and some European 
countries, it has traditionally been held in Japan that the best way to prepare for a secure life 
after retirement is not to save but to bear a sufficient number of children, or to raise adopted 
children, who will look after the retired parents (Komiya (1966), p. 176)." 
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concerning the lack of validity of the basic premise of the life-cycle hypothesis is correct. 
There are essentially two types of evidence that bear on this issue. One is evidence on 
how important saving for life during retirement is as a motive for saving, while the other 
is evidence on how important savings accumulated during one's working years are as a 
source of income during retirement. I present both types of evidence in turn. 
I. Evidence on Motives for Saving. 
The best source of data on motives for saving is the Public Opinion Survey on Saving 
(Chochiku-ni kan-suru Seron-chosa), which is conducted annually by the Central Council 
for Savings Promotion (Chochiku Zokyo Ch ilo-iinkai). Tables 6 through 9 present data 
from this survey concerning the relative importance of saving for life during retirement as 
a motive for saving. 
Looking first at Table 6, this table shows what percent of the respondents in each age 
group cited each motive listed as their single most important motive for saving in the 1983 
survey. The results for all ages show that saving for life during retirement was the third 
most common response (15 percent), coming after "for illness and other emergencies" (36 
percent) and "for one's children's educational and marriage expenses" (21 percent). 
(Fourth was "for the purchase, construction, repair, or renovation of land and housing" with 
14 percent.) However, the results broken down by age group reveal considerable varia-
tion in the rankings of the various motives. Neglecting "for illness and other emergencies," 
Table 6: Motives for Saving by Age Group 
Age Group 
Motive for Saving 
I 20-29 I 30-39 I :0-49 ! 50-59 ! 60-69 ! 70-79 All 
For illness and other unexpected emergencies 36.1 30.3 35.9 38.8/ 32.8 I 39.4 I 35.3 
For life during retirement 15.4 0.6 4.4 10.4 24.5 I 33.0 I 27.4 




11. 8 I For the purchase, construction, repair, or 
renovation of land and housing 14.3 25.3 24.4 10.1 6.2 6.8 
For the purchase of consumer durables 1.3 2.8 1.8 1.4 0.9 0.6 0.5 
For travel and other leisure activities 0.9 1.7 1.0 0.5 0.8 1.7 1.6 
For the payment of taxes 1.0 1.1 0.5 O. 7 1.2 1.5 2. 1 
No specific purpose but for a feeling of security 7.0 13.5 9.0 5.41 5.4 7.5 8.4 
Other 0.7[ 2.2 0.4 0.61 0.3 0.4 4. 7 
No answer 2.6 2.8 2.3 [ 1. 91 3.6 2.4 3.7 
Total 100.01 100. 0 1 100.0 I 100.0 I 100.0 100.0 1 100.0 
Note: 
The figures indicate what percent of all respondents cited each motive as their single most 
important motive for saving. The figures may not add due to rounding error. 
Source: 
The Central Council for Savings Promotion (Chochiku Zokyo Chuo-iinkai), Chochiku-ni kan-suTU 
SeTon-ch6sa (The Public Opinion Survey on Saving) (Tokyo: The Central Council for Savings 
Promotion, 1983), 1983 edition. 
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which is a precautionary motive that is important for all age groups and focusing on 
specific motives for saving, we see that saving for one's children's educational and marriage 
expenses and housing-related saving are the major motives for saving until about age fifty, 
with housing-related saving peaking in the twenties and thirties and education- and 
marriage-related saving peaking in the forties (this is consistent with the typical Japanese 
life cycle). Saving for life during retirement is unimportant for those in their twenties, 
thirties, and forties (with only I, 4, and [0 percent, respectively, of respondents in these 
age groups citing it as their most important motive for saving), and it does not become the 
dominant specific motive for saving until the 50-59 age group (33, 39, and 35 percent of 
those in their fifties, sixties, and seventies, respectively, cite it as their most important 
motive for saving). It thus appears that saving for more urgent expenditures such as 
housing and one's children's education and marriage preoccupy younger households, meaning 
that the household head is near retirement before saving for life during retirement finally 
becomes the foremost motive for saving. This suggests that, while the life-cycle motive 
is present in Japan, it IS not the dominant motive for saving except for those nearing 
retirement. 
Turning to Table 7, this table shows trends over time in the proportion of respondents 
Table 7: The Importance of Saving for Life during Retirement 








1974 i 37.3 
I 
(14.7) 3 13.9 4 - I -




1975 38. 1 
I 
(14.9) 3 13.0 4 
1965 29.8 (13.2) 3 - - 1976 41. 8 (16.2) 3 14.4 4 




1977 38.5 I 
(14.9) 3 14.8 I 4 
1967 37.9 (14.3) 3 10.9 4 1978 40.2 (15.9) 3 13.2 I 4 
1968
1 
36.6 (13.8) 3.5 -
I 
- 1979 39.8 
I 
(15.7) 3 13.9 4 
I 
1969 36.5 (14.3) 3 I - - 1980 38.4 (15. I) 3 11. 3 4 
! 




4 , 1981 36.4 I 
(14.6) 3 13.4 
I 
4 
1971 37.5 (14.9) 3 14.2 4 
I 
1982 42.1 I (16.8) 3 15.3 3 






41.0 (16.3) 3 15.4 I 
1973 35. 7 (14.0) 3 12.5 4 il I 
Note: 
Column (1) shows what percent of the respondents cited "saving for life during retirement" as 
one of up to three motives for saving. Column (2) adjusts for variations over time in the 
average number of responses per respondent by scaling the actual percentage figure in column 
(1) so that the sum of the percentages for all motives equals 100. Column (3) indicates the 
rank of "saving for life during retirement" as a motive for saving based on the figures presented 
in columns (1) and (2). Column (4) indicates what percent of the respondents cited "saving 
fOT life during retirement" as tht:ir most important motive for saving (these figures have not 
been adjusted because, since multiple responses were not permitted, the percentages sum to 100 
even without adjustment). Column (5) indicates the rank of "saving for life during retirement" 
as a motive for saving based on the figures presented in column (4). 
Source: 
The Central Council for Savings Promotion (Chochiku Zokyo Chuo-iinkai), Chochiku-ni kan-suru 
Scron-chosa (The Public Opinion Survey on Saving) (Tokyo: The Central Council for Savings 
Promotion, annual), various issues. 
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citing saving for life during retirement as one of their motives for saving as well as in the 
proportion citing it as their single most important motive for saving. The results for the 
former show that saving for life during retirement was consistently the third most important 
motive for saving, while the results for the latter show that it was consistently the fourth 
most important motive for saving until it overtook housing-related saving in 1982 to attain 
the third position. Thus, the importance of saving for life during retirement has been 
remarkably stable over time, showing no long-run trend and merely alternating between 
periods of increase and periods of decrease, each of up to several years' duration. The 
increase during the 1973-76 period is especially noteworthy because it was in 1973 that 
public pension benefits were greatly improved, and we would therefore have expected a 
decline in the percent saving for life during retirement after 1973. The reason why the 
opposite occurred is not clear, but it is also interesting to note that the upward trend has 
recently resumed, with both series attaining all-time highs in 1982 or 1983. A possible 
cause is government reports warning of the rapid aging (korei-ka) of the population and 
stressing the need to prepare by oneself for one's retirement. 
Finally, Tables 8 and 9 allow comparisons of motive data for the United States and 
Japan for 1966 and 1978, respectively. The precautionary motive is not surprisingly the 
dominant motive in both countries, but the relative importance of the other motives exhibit 
interesting differences. Saving for life during retirement is by far [he most important 
Table 8: A U. S.-Japan Comparison of Saving Motive, (1966) 
Motives for saving 
For illness and other unexpected emergencies 
For life during retirement 
For one's children's educational and marriage expenses I 
For the purchase, construction, repair, or renovation of land and housing i 
For the purchase of consumer durables [ 
No specific purpose but for a feeling of security j 
Japan 
70. I (30.5)1 





All other motives 
No answer 
15.7 (6.7)1 
I 0.7 (0.3) 
1229.9 (100.0)1 Total 
Note: 
















The figures show what percent of the respondents indicated that they were saving for each 
motive. Multiple responses were permitted in the surveys of both countries but since the average 
number of responses per respondent was different, the figures are not directly comparable. The 
figures in parentheses have been scaled so that they sum to 100; they indicate what percent 
of all responses were for each saving motive. The figures may not add due to rounding error. 
Source: 
The Japanese data are from The Central Council for Savings Promotion, op. cit. (l966). The 
United States data are from the Consumer Expenditure Survey conducted by the University of 
Michigan Survey Research Center, the results of which are reproduced in Kawasaki, Akio, 
"Nichibei-ryokoku ni-okeru Kojin-chochiku-doko-no Hikaku" (A U. S.-Japan Comparison of 
Trends in Personal Saving), Chochiku Jiho, no. 124 (june 1980), p. 46. 
THE APPLICABILITY OF THE LIFE-CYCLE HYPOTHESIS OF SAVING TO JAPAN 49 
Table 9: A U. S.-japan Comparison of Saving Motives (l97B) 
Motives for saving 
For i1lness and other unexpected emergencies 
For life during retirement 
For one's children's educational and marriage expenses 
For the purchase, construl:tion, repair, or renovation of land and housing 
For the purchase of consumer durables 
No specific purpose but for a feeling of security 




See previous table. 
Source: 
japan 
77.9 (30. B) 
40.2 05.9) 
50.5 (20. 0) 
32.2 (12.7) 
8. 7 ( 3.4) 
27.6 (10.9) 
15.3 ( 6. 0) 
O. 7 ( 0.3) 
253.1 (100. 0) 




B ( 5) 





The Japanese data are from The Central Council for Savings Promotion, op. cit. 0978 edition). 
The U. S. data are from a public opinion survey conducted by the American Life Insurance 
Association, the results of which are reproduced in The Central Council for Savings Promotion, 
Savings and Savings Promotion Movement in Japan (Tokyo: The Central Council for Savings Pro-
motion, 1981), page lB. 
specific motIve for saving In both U. S. surveys but is only second in Japan in both years. 
In terms of actual magnitudes, the two comparisons suggest that saving for life during 
retirement is roughly one-and-a-half to two times as prevalent in the United States. (By 
contrast, saving for one's children's educational and marriage expenses and housing-related 
saving are more important in Japan.) Thus, it appears that, while the life-cycle motive 
is present in both countries, it is far more important in the United States. 
To sum up, we have seen that, while saving for life during retirement does occur In 
Japan, it is of only secondary importance (except for those nearing retirement) and its 
prevalence is far less than in the United States. 
2. Evidence on Sources of Income during Retirement. 
The second type of evidence concerning the basic premise of the life-cycle hypothesis 
is evidence on sources of income during retirement. An excellent source of data on this 
issue is provided by the International Comparative Survey on the Lives and Attitudes of 
the Aged (Rojin-no Seikatsu-to Ishiki-ni kan-suru Kokusai-hikaku-chosa), which was 
conducted in 1981 by the Prime Minister's Secretariat, Office for Policy toward the Aged 
(Naikaku-sori-daijin-kanbo Rojin-taisaku-shitsu). In this survey, about 1000 individuals 
(both male and female) aged sixty and over were surveyed in each of five countries 
(japan, Thailand, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France). 
Table 10 presents data from this survey on the sources of income of the elderly in 
each country. The table indicates that a greater percent of the elderly in the U. S. rely 
on "drawing down of saving deposits" than in the other four countries (22. 0%), with the 












C. Y. HORIOKA 
Table 10: An International Comparison of Sources of Income during Retirement 




41. 0 42. I I 27.3 II. 6 5. I (31. 3) (29.9) , (15.2) (6.5) (3.5) 
Public pensions 64.6 
I 
4. I 82. I 87.7 74.9 
(34.9) (2.2) (53.9) (64.0) (64.6) 
Private pensions (company pensions, etc.) 8.4 0.4 27. I 35.5 49.3 
(3.8) (0.2) (10.0) (13.5) (17.8) 
Drawing down of saving deposits I I. 4 6.9 22.0 15.2 6.9 
(2. I) (I. 7) (I. 7) (I. 6) (I. 9) 
Property income (interest, dividends! rent) 15.6 8.3 45. I 13. I I I. 9 
(5.3) (3.8) (14.5) (2.2) (3.6) 
Support from one's children 29.8 79. 7 2.4 1.7 3.3 
(IS. 6) (58.2) (0.3) (0.5) (I. 0) 
Welfare 1.7 0.5 3.3 13.6 4.3 
(I. 2) (0. I) (0.7) (3. I) (I. 2) 
Other 4.8 5.2 8.2 5. 7 4. 7 
(3. I) (3.4) (3.5) (2.6) (3.3) 
No answer 1.0 0.5 O. I 0.9 0.5 
(2.7) (0.5) (0.2) (6. I) (3. I) 
Totals 178.4 147.7 217.6 184.9 161. 0 
Note: 
The figures are from an international survey of aged individuals (those aged 60 or more) and 
indicate the percent of respondents citing each source listed as one of their sources of income. 
The figures in parentheses indicate the percent of respondents citing each source as their 
primary source of income. 
Source: 
Prime Minister's Secretariat, Office for Policy toward the Aged (Naikaku-soridaijin-kanbo Rojin~ 
taisaku-shitsu). ed., Rajin-no Seikatsu-to Ishiki (The Lives and Attitudes of the Aged) (Tokyo: 
Ministry of Finance Printing Bureau [Okura-sho Insatsu-kyokuJ, 1982), page 194. 
eiderly in japan rely on drawing down of saving deposits as a source of income, a propor-
tion which is about half of the corresponding proportion in the United States. This 
evidence suggests that dissaving during retirement, which is an integral part of the Iife-
cycle model, is apparently not widespread in any country and far less widespread in japan 
than it is in the United States. If one focuses on the figures for the percent relying on 
drawing down of saving deposits as their principal source of income, the figures are even 
lower, but here, the figure for japan is the highest (2. 1% vs. 1. 6-1.9% for the other 
countries). Even when one looks at the figures for the percent relying on either drawing 
down of saving deposits or property income (interest, dividends, rent, etc.) as their 
principal source of income, the figures are quite low (ranging from 16.2% for the United 
States and 7.496 for japan to 5.596' or lower for the other three countries). Thus, these 
figures provide only very limited support [or the life-cycle hypothesis and suggest that it 
is even less applicable in Japan than it is in the United States. 
Also noteworthy is the contrast between japan (and Thailand) and the West with 
respect to the degree of reliance on support from one's children, which confirms what 1 
stated earlier. As Table 10 shows, only a very small percent (1.7 to 3.3 percent) of the 
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elderly in the U. S. and Europe receive any support at all from their children, whereas 
29. 8 percent of the elderly in Japan receive support from their children. Moreover, the 
contrast in the percent of the elderly relying on support from their children as their 
primary source of income is equally striking (0.3 to 1.0 percent in the U. S. and Europe 
versus 15. 6 percent in Japan). 
To summarize the other findings more briefly, the table also shows that the percent of 
elderly individuals relying on employment income is much higher in Japan (and Thailand) 
than in the West and that the percent relying on public pensions is somewhat lower in 
Japan (and much lower in Thailand), which again confirms what I stated earlier. The 
finding that the percent relying on private pensions is also lower in Japan (and Thailand) 
is seemingly at variance with what I stated earlier, but the discrepancy probably arises 
because lump-sum retirement payments were not included either separately or with private 
pensions in the question on the survey. Thus, the table confirms my earlier claims in 
addition to attesting to the limited applicability of the life-cycle hypothesis in Japan. 
A very different type of evidence on the same issue was obtained elsewhere in the 
same survey. Respondents were asked: "Which of the following views coincides most 
closely with your own view about living expenses during retirement? (1) One should 
prepare for retirement during one's working years and not depend on one's family or on 
others. (2) One's family members should meet one's living expenses during retirement. 
(3) One's living expenses during retirement should be financed by social security." Table 
11 presents the results for each country. As the table shows, view (1) (which corresponds 
most closely to the life-cycle model) is predominant in the United States and Japan, while 
view (2) is predominant in Thailand and view (3) is predominant in the United Kingdom 
and France. It is somewhat surprising that the percent of the respondents adhering to 
Table 11: An International Comparison of Attitudes toward the Financing of One's 
Living Expenses during Retirement 
I Japan I Thailand I U. S. A. U. K. France 
View 1: One should prepare fOT retirement I 
during one's working years and not depend 
on one's family or on others. 
View 2: One's family members should meet 
one's living expenses during retirement. 
View 3: One's living expenses during retirement 





55.0 24. 7 
18.8 61. 4 




60. 7 44.2 27.5 
0.6 0.2 2.2 
29. 1 47. I 66.1 
6.0 6.4 2.9 
3.6 2. 1 1.3 
100.0 100.0 100.0 
The figures represent the percent of respondents indicating that their own view corresponds 
most closely to ea.ch view. 
Source: 
Prime Minister's Secretariat, Office for Policy toward the Aged, op. cit., page 182. 
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view (I) is as high as it is, ."peciallyin the United States and Japan,given the earlier evidence 
concerning the limited "fJlJJicability of the life-cycle model. This discrepancy suggests that 
the life-cycle hypothesi, is much more applicable in all countries when one goes by 
people's intentions or att.tudes than it is when one goes by actual resuits. In other words 
it seems that many peoplt: intend to finance their lives during retirement with their own 
savings or feel that this is the most desirable state of affairs but, after reaching retirement 
age, find that their savinf(:l are insufficient and are forced to rely on support from their 
children, public pensions, and other sources of income. 
Another conclusion slJ~~ested by the results is that the life-cycle hypothesis is perhaps 
most applicable in the United States and also more applicable in Japan than in other 
countries. At the same lime, however, it should be noted that views (2) and (3) are also 
relatively common in Japan and that view (2) is far more common in Japan (and 
Thailand) than it is in the United States and Europe. This is consistent with the earlier 
finding that reliance on ramily support as a source of retirement income is far greater in 
Japan (and Thailand) tha" in the United States and Europe. Thus, while it is true that 
the life-cycle hypothesis i.s highly applicable in Japan as far as people's intentions and 
attitudes are concerned, rdiance on family support is far greater in Japan (and Thailand) 
than in the West whetl,,:!' one goes by people's intentions and attitudes or by actual 
results. 
The far greater impol'lance of family support in the East is illustrated even more 
dramatically in Table 12, which shows with whom elderly individuals tend to live in each 
country. The table shows quite clearly that the elderly are far, far more likely to live 
with their children (and ~r:mdchildren) (and presumably to receive support in kind) m 
Table 12: An Intel'national Comparison of the Living Arrangements of the Elderly 
Japan I Thailand I U. S. A. U.K. France 
I. Your spouse 65.4 I 51.1 I 47.0 49.1 55. B 
I 
, 
2. Your married child (mnh'l 41. 0 25.3 I 0.9 0.5 3.5 
3. Your married child (felliaie ) 9.2 37.B i 2.5 1.9 5.6 
4. Your child's spouse 34.0 49.2 1.6 O. 7 3.5 
5. Your unmarried child lB. 7 33.0 9.0 5. I 10.6 
6. Your grandchild 41. 0 62.6 3.8 1.1 5.B 
7. Other relatives 2.9 8.2 4. I 4.2 5. 3 
B. Non-relatives O. 7 3.4 2.3 1.2 1.0 
9. Living alone 5. 7 4. 7 41. 3 41. 6 30.0 
No answer 0.3 0.0 O. 3 0.0 0.4 
Totals 219.0 275.3 112.B 105.3 121. 7 
Note: 
The figures indicate [hr' pt'fcent of respondents who currently live with each category of family 
member. 
Source: 
Prime Minister's Secrer:lfi.H. Office for Policy toward the Aged, op. cit., page 51. 
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Japan and Thailand than in the United States and Europe. For example, 41. 0 percent of the 
elderly surveyed in Japan live with their married sons whereas the corresponding figure for 
the United States and Europe is only O. 5 to 3.5 percent. (The percent of the elderly 
living with their married daughters is lower due to cultural reasons but is still much higher 
than it is in the West.) In addition, the percent of the elderly living with their children's 
spouses and with their grandchildren is also much higher in Japan than in the West 
(34.0 percent versus 0.7 to 3.5 percent for the former and 41.0 percent versus I. 1 to 
5. 8 percent for the latter). 
Thus, it appears that there is a close connection between the prevalence of family 
support of the elderly and the prevalence of extended family living arrangements. Both 
are negligible in the West and very high in Japan (and Thailand). This relationship is, of 
course, not entirely coincidental inasmuch as living together with one's parents is itself a 
form of assistance (allowing the parents to save on housing costs) and also facilitates other 
transfers in kind (such as the sharing of food and other living expenses). 
To summarize the results of this section briefly, it appears that the basic premise of 
the life-cycle hypothesis is most valid in the United States and also has some validity in 
Japan. A key difference between Japan and the West, however, is the far greater 
reliance on support from one's children during retirement. 
V Toward a Modified Life-Cycle Hypothesis 
Having found that the life-cycle hypothesis has only limited validity in the case of 
Japan, the next logical step is to consider what alternative hypothesis or what modification 
of the life-cycle hypothesis would provide a better description of the behavior of Japanese 
individuals. The foregoing evidence strongly suggests that the support received by the 
elderly from their children must be given a role in any model of Japanese life-cycle 
behavior in light of the far greater prevalence of such support in Japan. In addition, it 
appears desirable to confer a role on bequests as well inasmuch as casual observation 
suggests that they are relatively prevalent in Japan. 
To assist in our inquiry, I now present data on the attitude of the Japanese toward 
bequests that are taken from the Attitude Survey on Wealth Transmission (Shisan-sozoku-
ni tsuite-no Ishiki-chosa), which was conducted in 1979 by the Prime Minister's Secretariat, 
Office for Policy toward the Aged (Naikaku-sori-daijin-kanbo Rojin-taisaku-shitsu). One 
question in this survey concerned the pollees' attitudes toward the division of their wealth 
among their children; in particular, they were asked to indicate which of the four views 
listed ("Give all to the eldest son," "Give to the child who is ill or physically weak or who 
has no income-earning power," "Divide equally among one's children," and "Give more to 
the child or children who did more for me") coincided most closely with theIr own view. 
The results, which are shown in Table 13, indicate that the most common responses were 
"Give everything to the eldest son" (43. 2 percent) and "Give more to the child O! 
children who did more for me" (35. I percent). These two responses account for more 
than thlee-quarters of the respondents. Moreover, since custom decrees that the eldest 
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Table 13: The Attitudes of the Elderly in Japan toward the Distribution 
of Their Assets among Their Children 
Total Males 
Total 100.0 100.0 
Give all to the eldest son 43.2 45.4 
Give to the child who is ill or physically weak or who has no 4.3 4. I income-earning power 
Divide equally among one's children 12. I II. 4 
Give more to the child or children who did more for me 35. I 34.0 
Other 2.8 2.6 










The figures represent the percent of respondents whose own views coincide with each of the 
views presented. 
Source: 
Prime Ministers Secretariat, Office for .Policy toward the Aged (Naikaku-sori-daijin-kanbo 
R6jintaisaku-shitsu), "Shisan-sozoku-ni tsuite-no Ishiki-chosa" (Attitude Survey on Wealth 
Transmission) (1979), the results of which are summarized in Prime Minister's Secretariat, 
Office for Policy toward the Aged (Naikaku-sori-daijin-kanbo Rojin-taisaku-shitsu), ed., Kurei-
sha Mondai Sogo ChiJsa-Hokoku (Comprehensive Report on Surveys concerning the Problems 
of the Aged) (Tokyo: Shakai-fukushi-hQjin Zenkoku Shakai Fukushi Ky6gikai, 1982), page 222. 
son live with his aged parents and provide them with whatever assistance is needed, the 
response "Give everything to the eldest son" can be regarded as a subset of the response 
"Give more to the child or children who did more for me." Thus, it can be said that over 
three-quarters of the respondents felt that their wealth should be distributed among their 
children according to the amount of (financial and other) assistance received from each 
child. 
I am now ready to synthesize the evidence I have presented into a modified version 
of the life-cycle hypothesis. We saw earlier that, to the extent that the life-cycle 
hypothesis does not apply to Japan (i. e., to the extent that living expenses during 
retirement are not financed by dissaving), much of the "shortfall" is met by support from 
one's children. Moreover, as just noted, the elderly in Japan appear to distribute their 
wealth among their children primarily on the basis of the amount of assistance received 
from each child. Thus, they in effect "borrow" from their children in order to finance 
their living expenses during retirement and repay these "debts" in the form of a bequest 
at the time of their death. This implies that, even if much of the saving of the Japanese 
were ostensibly for bequests, it would in reality be for life-cycle purposes, inasmuch as the 
bequest is indirectly used to finance consumption during retirement. Thus, although the 
standard life-cycle hypothesis is of only limited applicability in Japan, a variant of it appears 
to provide a reasonably good description of saving behavior in Japan. lOl 
10) Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers (1984) have conducted an interesting game-theoretic analysis 
of bequests which demonstrates how parents can use the way in which their wealth is to be 
distributed as a means of coercing their children into looking after them. It is unclear whether 
Japanese parents consciously think in these terms, but the end result appears to be the same. 
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The only remaining question-namely, why the Japanese conform to the "modified" 
life-cycle hypothesis rather than to the standard version -is not so easily answered, but 
several possible reasons come to mind. 
( I) The elderly in Japan are loath to bear the risk of an uncertain lifespan, so they 
shift this risk onto their children by asking them to support them for the rest of their lives 
(no matter how long that turns out to be) in exchange for a fixed payment (the bequest). 
( 2) Because of the relatively high price of land and housing in Japan, a higher 
proportion of the wealth of the elderly is in the form of land and housing, and because 
land and housing are far less liquid than other types of assets, it is difficult for the 
elderly to finance their living expenses during retirement by liquidating their wealth 
holdings. (If it were true that the Japanese have a stronger preference for living in 
owner-occupied (single-family) homes, this would also help to explain why they are reluctant 
to sell their homes since "reverse mortgages" are still rare in Japan.) 
( 3) Making substantial bequests to one's children, especially one's eldest son, is a 
custom with a long history in Japan because the family is a much more closely knit unit 
in Japan than in other countries.!1> In particular, there is a long standing custom of 
bequeathing one's home to one's eldest son, which would, together with (2), explain 
why the Japanese refrain from selling their homes to finance their living expenses during 
retirement. 
(4) As another consequence of the strength of the family unit, Japanese children 
feel a strong obligation to provide (economic as well as other forms of) assistance to their 
aged parents. 
As the foregoing list of possible reasons suggests, the issue of why the Japanese tend 
to conform to the modified life-cycle hypothesis may be related to Japanese culture and 
traditions, although it may also be partly due to economic factors such as (I) and (2). 
At any rate, it appears that the life-cycle hypothesis or a modified version thereof may 
be valid for the case of Japan after all and hence may provide a partial explanation of 
Japan's high household saving rate. However, more rigorous empirical tests are clearly 
necessary before a definitive verdict can be rendered. 
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